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Abstract 
Several streams of literature have examined the phenomenon of ‘markets for inventions’, that 
is, the trade of elements of knowledge which are ‘disembodied’ from individuals, 
organizations and products. The aims of this paper are to bring together the various streams 
of research in this area and discuss their major assumptions and limitations, in order to 
provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the phenomenon, and identify 
promising paths for future research. We start our review by identifying the object of market 
exchange – that is, an invention whose knowledge has been codified and disembodied from 
individuals, organizations or artifacts. We then identify those factors that enable firms to 
trade inventions, distinguishing between institutional-, firm-, and industry-level factors. We 
close our analysis of the extant literature by discussing the implications of markets for 
inventions for firm behavior and performance. Against this background, we highlight an 
important avenue for future research. A neglected implication of the development of 
invention markets is that firms are confronted with a wide variety of technological paths from 
which to choose, because the opportunity to acquire technologies on the market offers them a 
greater variety that can their internal R&D departments. However, the streams of research on 
markets for inventions and on R&D allocation strategies have been surprisingly disconnected 
so far. Hence, in the final section, we start to establish and explore the link between these 
literatures, and to identify a research agenda in this domain. 
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Introduction 
Several streams of literature over the past twenty years have challenged the traditional tenet 
that the entire innovation process, from idea generation to commercialization, is performed 
within the organizational boundaries of single firms. Be it the more economic-oriented 
research on markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2001) and markets for 
ideas (Gans & Stern, 2003), or the more managerial literature on open innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006), they have all emphasized 
that knowledge has been increasingly traded on markets as a ‘free-standing’ entity, 
‘disembodied’ from individuals, organizations and products. To provide a unifying label for 
all these streams we call this phenomenon ‘markets for inventions’ - but despite this common 
starting point, contributions in this area have focused on different aspects of the phenomenon, 
and followed different theoretical perspectives.  
The more economic-oriented contributions have dealt with the creation of invention 
markets, the inefficiencies (information asymmetries and opportunistic behavior) that limit 
them, and potential solutions (e.g., Anton & Yao, 1994; Arora 1995). At the firm level, 
research in this area has mainly focused on identifying factors that affect firms’ incentives to 
trade in technologies (e.g. Arora et al. 2001; Fosfuri, 2006). This literature has also explored 
the industry-wide consequences of markets for inventions, emphasizing that they encourage 
specialization and the division of labor according to comparative advantages, especially 
between smaller and larger firms (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2002). 
In contrast, organization and management scholars have focused to a greater extent on the 
role of norms regulating knowledge transactions (e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, 2008), the 
firm capabilities that enhance the possibility of participating in technology transactions (e.g., 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1989), and the managerial implications of the existence of markets where 
inventions can be traded (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). The aim 
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of this paper is to bring together all these literature streams and to discuss their major 
assumptions and limitations, so as to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding 
the phenomenon, and to identify promising paths for future research. 
We start our review by identifying the object of market exchange - that is, an invention 
whose knowledge has been codified and which is ‘disembodied’. While knowledge 
codification is a pre-condition for markets for inventions to exist, the actual development of 
these markets also depends on other enabling factors, which we discuss next. We first 
identify the role of institutions, distinguishing between the formal (intellectual property 
rights, contracts) and the informal (social norms, relational governance). Our analysis 
continues by focusing on the firm and industry characteristics that affect decisions to license. 
In particular, regarding firm characteristics, we focus on firm-level factors - such as 
organizational size and structure - that influence their incentives to operate in markets for 
inventions, and on their capabilities; regarding industry structure, we analyze the role of 
competition, product differentiation and demand fragmentation. We close our analysis of the 
literature by discussing the implications of markets for inventions for firms. Figure 1 provides 
a representation of the structure of the review.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Against this background, we conclude our review by highlighting an important avenue 
for future research. A neglected implication of the development of invention markets is that 
firms are confronted with an ever-wider variety of technological paths from which to choose, 
because the market offers them a larger variety of technologies than can their (inevitably 
smaller) internal R&D departments. As a result, their decisions about how best to allocate 
their financial resources among all these technologies - which we define as their R&D 
allocation strategies - have become more crucial than ever. The R&D allocation strategy 
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problem has certainly already been addressed by several streams of research, which have 
analyzed how companies should spread their resources among different technologies, with 
the aim of discovering their value, or, once their value is clear, of maximizing the returns to 
their investments in commercialization. But research on markets for inventions, on the one 
hand, and on R&D allocation strategy, on the other, have been surprisingly disconnected to 
date - so, in our final section, we propose a preliminary link between these literatures, which 
might suggest a fruitful research direction. 
 
Defining Markets for Invention: Codified Knowledge Exchanged for a Price 
By definition, markets are arenas in which objects are exchanged for a price. We can say that 
the boundaries of markets for inventions are delimited by two characteristic elements: that 
inventions are exchanged for a price; and that they are codified and traded in ‘disembodied’ 
form, independent from any other entity or artifact. The first factor distinguishes markets for 
inventions from other forms of knowledge exchange such as free revealing, while the second 
distinguishes them from markets for products and other markets in which knowledge is 
embedded within other factors or assets, such as markets for human capital or for firms. We 
discuss these two elements in detail below: Table 1 provides a summary of selected papers 
which define the phenomenon of markets for inventions.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Price as the Element Discriminating Markets for Inventions from Other Forms of Knowledge 
Exchange 
Typically, markets are ‘spaces’ where buyers pay prices to sellers to acquire assets of one sort 
or another: and markets for inventions are no different, as the literatures on both markets for 
technology (e.g., Arora et al., 2001) and markets for ideas (Gans & Stern, 2003) point out. 
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Hence, we could use the existence of pecuniary transfer from buyer to seller as one way of 
discriminating markets for inventions from other forms of knowledge exchanges that occur 
outside markets - known as ‘free revealing’ , (e.g. Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; von 
Hippel, 2010).  
To delimit better the boundaries of markets for inventions it is important to understand 
the conditions under which firms might be willing to freely reveal knowledge, rather than 
trading in it. First, inventors may be willing to reveal without pecuniary reward when 
revealing their ideas can increase their reputations among their peers (Merton, 1973; Stephan 
1996), or when it is their only option if they want to see it in use (von Hippel, 2010). 
Examples of such free revealing have been identified in the medical equipment (von Hippel 
& Finkelstein, 1979), semiconductor (Lim, 2000), library information system (Morrison, 
Roberts & von Hippel, 2000) and sporting equipment industries (Franke & Shah, 2003), as 
well as being the basis of open source software communities (Franke & von Hippel, 2003; 
von Hippel, 2010; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003).  
A party might also reveal a piece of knowledge or information to gain an ‘indirect’ 
reward – one that is pecuniary, but is delayed beyond the moment when the knowledge is 
disclosed: for instance, small firms or individual inventors may disclose their inventions to 
establish their legitimacy, perhaps with the aim of increasing the likelihood of subsequent 
liquidity events, such as IPOs or acquisitions (Waguespack & Fleming, 2008). Free revealing 
can also provide individual inventors with access to complementary information that they can 
use to improve their inventions (Raymond, 1999) or to low-cost marketing channels (Gruber 
& Henkel, 2006; Henkel, 2006), which might be particularly crucial for those with limited 
resources. In other cases, firms might adopt a partial free revealing approach, where only one 
part of the invention is given away free, but other parts need to be bought (Chesbrough 
&Appleyard, 2007; Henkel, 2006).  
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The cases outlined above refer to circumstances in which knowledge exchange occurs 
without an (immediate) pecuniary transfer from seller to buyer. As such, these cases do not 
fall within the scope of research on markets for inventions, which focuses instead on those 
instances where knowledge is exchanged for a price. But the existence of a price is not a 
sufficient condition for defining markets for inventions – the characteristics of the object 
being exchanged are also fundamental in defining such markets, as we discuss below.  
 
Codified Knowledge as the Element Discriminating Markets for Inventions from Other 
Markets for Knowledge 
Codification as a pre-condition for markets for inventions. For the invention to be 
exchanged as a standalone object, the underlying knowledge it holds must be codified (at 
least to some extent) – that is, articulated in an intelligible form such that it can be assessed, 
used and stored by the buyer after the transaction with no further (or with only minimal) input 
from the seller. In identifying the boundaries of markets for inventions, the key distinction we 
use is whether the knowledge inherent in an invention is codified in such a way that it can be 
autonomously reproduced by the receiver, or alternatively cannot be separated either from the 
artifact in which it is embodied or from the original knowledge source. These cases refer to 
the situation in which, for instance, knowledge is sold in the form of products or services. We 
would refer to these as markets for products or for services rather than as markets for 
invention. Similarly, if the knowledge is sold as embodied in an organization as a whole, or 
held as tacit knowledge by individuals, we would refer to  markets for firms or for human 
capital. All this leaves us with the view that the codification of knowledge is a pre-condition 
for the existence of markets for inventions, in that it allows the invention to be identified as a 
separate ‘thing’ which can be traded discretely.  
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Interestingly, codification is not necessarily an inherent quality of knowledge. As 
Nelson and Winter (1982) emphasize, the level of codification is instead determined to a 
great extent by individuals or organizations. In particular, they point out that whether a 
certain knowledge piece is codified or not depends on whether the costs of codification 
exceed the benefits (hence, if costs decrease, firms have more incentive to articulate their 
knowledge). In fact, the costs of codifying knowledge have substantially diminished since the 
end of the last century, mainly due to, as Arora and Gambardella (1994a, p. 525) note, 
“advances in three areas: theoretical understanding of problems, instrumentation, and 
computational capability”. These factors have made it easier to understand the principles 
governing a phenomenon as opposed to relying on a trial and error approach – thus 
knowledge has become less context-dependent and can be more cheaply articulated into 
general and abstract codes. 
This greater ‘universality’ of knowledge has allowed innovation processes to be 
organized in new ways. Tacit and context-dependent information calls for integrating the 
innovative process within organizational boundaries – as was traditional in the last century – 
because such knowledge is typically transmitted through the social interactions occurring 
within internal boundaries, where individuals share common “languages” (e.g., Nonaka, 
1991), so can easily interact face-to-face. As Kogut and Zander (1992) point out, tacit 
knowledge can be shared and transferred more effectively within firms than across markets. 
In contrast, codified knowledge can be easily transmitted outside the firms’ boundaries, so 
that it can facilitate a “division of innovative labor”, with different, perhaps unaffiliated, 
organizations conducting different parts of the innovation process (Arora & Gambardella, 
1994a). 
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Codification, the division of innovative labor and modularity. The division of 
innovative labor due to knowledge codification has occurred at two different levels. First, 
there has been a vertical division of innovative labor, where different firms specialize in 
different value chain activities on the basis of their comparative advantage. This has mainly 
led to a division of labor between small and large firms which have tended to specialize, 
respectively, in invention and commercialization activities (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a). 
Second, there has been a division of labor at the system level: greater codification has meant 
that knowledge components underlying many systems have become increasingly independent 
from each other, to the point where they can be generated, developed and managed by 
different organizations and re-assembled at a later stage. So, many systems have migrated 
towards higher levels of modularity.  
Modularity refers to the extent to which a system’s components are (or can be) 
separated and recombined, and the degree to which the ‘rules’ of the system enable such 
component recombination (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2011; Schilling, 2000). The shift toward 
modularity has favored the development of markets for inventions, since, as they reduce the 
level of coordination required among different components (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011), 
modular systems are suited to being coordinated via market governance rather than by 
organizational hierarchies (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). It is important, however, to note that 
the effect of modularity in inducing firms to use markets rather than hierarchies is not 
immediate, but may take quite a long time to develop (Hoetker, 2006; Langlois, 2002; 
Schilling, 2000).  
To sum up, the literatures on markets for inventions (e.g., Arora & Gambardella, 
1994a) and modularity (e.g., Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) both suggest that knowledge 
codification has been the precondition for the division of innovative labor via invention 
markets. They also recognize that the process leading from codification to markets for 
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inventions can be self-reinforcing, in that firms aiming to exploit the advantages arising from 
the division of innovative labor may invest in further knowledge codification. Winter (1987) 
discusses this issue at some length, arguing that firms can choose the extent of their 
knowledge codification strategically. For instance, if they judge that collaborating with other 
organizations could be fruitful, they will invest in greater codification, as it makes 
exchanging knowledge between unaffiliated parties easier.  
In the same way, the possibility of collaborating via markets for inventions may induce 
firms producing complex products to decompose the knowledge underlying their production 
process and articulate some compatibility design rules, thus allowing them to shift toward a 
more modular system and take advantage of the modular innovations produced by many 
independent suppliers (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Of course, codification is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the existence of markets for inventions. Even if an invention is 
codified and thus available for exchange, other factors may still prevent the growth of such 
markets. The following sections focus on the other necessary conditions for markets for 
inventions to exist (or thrive).  
 
Determinants of Markets for Inventions  
Several studies have investigated the conditions under which firms use market transactions to 
buy or sell technologies. In particular, we can distinguish between two groups of studies. One 
group is more closely rooted in the economic tradition: its contributions tend to investigate 
firms’ incentives to engage in technology transactions, and consequently focus to a greater 
extent on the institutional factors that increase such incentives by reducing market 
imperfections, especially intellectual property (IP) rights (Gans et al., 2002) and the effective 
design of contracts (e.g., Arora 1996). They are also interested in how industry structures 
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affect firms’ decisions to buy or sell inventions (e.g., Anton &Yao, 1994; Bresnahan & 
Gambardella, 1998; Fosfuri, 2006).  
A second group of studies is more closely positioned instead within the organizational 
and management literature, and their contributions generally analyze how firms’ capabilities 
affect their chances of engaging in technology transactions by allowing them to evaluate 
technologies more accurately and/or make more effective use of them (e.g., Cohen & 
Levinthal 1990). Such studies also compare markets for inventions with other forms of 
knowledge exchange (such as free revealing) that do not occur within markets, but which still 
might be extremely relevant for company innovation and profitability (e.g., Chesbrough, 
2003; von Hippel, 2010).  
But the boundaries between these two groups are blurred. Thus some contributions 
from an economics tradition investigate firm characteristics that might facilitate the market 
exchange of inventions – such as organizational structure (e.g., Arora, Fosfuri & Roende, 
2013) or the ability of firms to assess technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 1994b) – while 
some studies from the management and organizational literatures analyze the importance of 
knowledge protection. In particular, some of these contributions investigate how social norms 
or relational governance may alleviate market imperfections (e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, 
2008). Table 2 provides a summary of selected papers that explore the determinants of 
markets for inventions, which are discussed further below.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Formal and Informal Institutions 
An important starting point for research on markets for inventions is the recognition that the 
characteristics of the good being transacted (i.e., the invention) can cause multiple sources of 
market inefficiencies. First, compared to physical goods, technology is characterized by a 
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substantial degree of uncertainty regarding its value (Rosenberg, 1996), which intensifies the 
problem of information asymmetry between parties, leading to possible adverse selection 
(Dushnitsky & Klueter, 2011; Shane, 2002). Second, technology transactions often require 
highly specialized complementary investments by the buyer or the seller, who are 
consequently highly exposed to the risk of ‘hold up’ (Shane, 2002). Third, firms dealing with 
technology transactions often face ‘small number’ bargaining problems, as only a limited 
number of players in the market can supply or exploit a certain technology, or have access to 
the appropriate downstream assets to commercialize it (Caves et al. 1983; Contractor, 1981; 
Pisano, 1990; Schilling & Steensma, 2002).  
Finally, as the knowledge underlying the technology is inherently intangible, once 
disclosed to a potential buyer who wants to assess its value, it inevitably leaks out (Arrow, 
1962), exposing inventors to a high threat of expropriation by the buyer. Sellers, also, can 
display opportunistic behavior, trying to skimp on the full effort required to transfer 
knowledge to the buyer (Arora, 1996). Consequently, several contributions have focused on 
the role of institutions in reducing inefficiencies in knowledge trades (e.g., Arora 1995; Gans, 
Hsu & Stern, 2008): taken overall, this research has identified multiple institutional factors 
that could alleviate market imperfections – intellectual property rights, social norms, 
contracts, and relational governance – and so increase the likelihood of inventions being 
traded on markets. 
 
Intellectual property rights. From a technology seller’s standpoint, one of the 
fundamental concerns about circulating knowledge on the market is the risk of expropriation. 
When the technology is disclosed to potential buyers so that they can assess its value, its 
underlying knowledge can leak out (Arrow, 1962). Similarly, from the buyer’s perspective, 
there can be a substantial amount of uncertainty regarding the scope of the invention, and the 
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possibility of using it without infringing the property rights of a third party (Gans et al., 
2002). Research on markets for technology has emphasized the importance of intellectual 
property rights (such as patents and copyright) as a fundamental condition for both 
preventing knowledge expropriation and reducing uncertainty about the actual scope of an 
invention (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans et al., 2002).  
Gans et al. (2002) show that companies are more likely to license their technology 
when intellectual property rights are effective, but when they provide weaker protection, 
companies are more inclined to try to profit from their innovations via downstream 
integration. Interestingly, the importance of intellectual property rights aligns with our earlier 
argument that the codification of knowledge is a pre-condition for the rise of markets for 
inventions. As Arora et al. (2001) point out, codified knowledge can be written more clearly 
(e.g., in blueprints), and thus the object to be protected can be defined less ambiguously. In 
the context of patented inventions, for instance, the fact that they will be codified in the 
patent documentation strengthens patent holders’ ability to enforce protection, and thus 
encourages knowledge trade. In this vein, Gans et al. (2008) show that licensing usually takes 
place within a narrow time window around the date of the patent grant, arguing that the grant 
reduces uncertainty and information asymmetry about the extent of property rights, and thus 
facilitates trade. 
However, the effectiveness of formal intellectual property rights can differ in different 
industries. For instance, markets for inventions tend to be more pervasive and operate better 
in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, where patent systems are relatively effective 
in protecting firm knowledge (Anand & Khanna 2000; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000; Levin, 
Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, 1987; Teece, 1998). The relevance of formal property rights in 
facilitating the development of markets for inventions can also depend on the alternative 
mechanisms which may be used to protect and/or successfully commercialize firm’s 
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inventions. For instance, Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) suggest patent protection only 
facilitates out-licensing where firms lack complementary assets. For those possessing such 
assets, greater patent protection increases the payoff from commercialization by reducing 
imitation after the product enters the market. Similarly, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) note that the 
strength of intellectual property rights in the semiconductor industry has promoted the entry 
of design firms that sell intellectual property but do not themselves manufacture chips. 
 
Social norms. While the economics literature has generally analyzed the relevance of 
formal institutions in protecting inventions, another stream of research – rooted more in 
organizational literature – has investigated the existence of mechanisms other than law-based 
intellectual property protection, such as norm-based intellectual property (Fauchart & von 
Hippel, 2008; Ostrom, 1990; Rai, 1999). Such systems are based on sets of implicit social 
rules that define accepted behaviors within a certain community. These ‘social norms’ are 
normally not written down, or even discussed explicitly, yet their violation tends to bring 
punishments, such as loss of status, shaming or denial of future community benefits.  
Several types of social norms are common in scientific communities, regulating 
different aspects of the scientific process, including invention, disclosure or social exchange 
(e.g. Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; Merton, 1973; Rai, 1999), 
and such community norms can reinforce, or be reinforced by, organizational norms (Henkel, 
2006). Norm-based intellectual property mechanisms are especially relevant in contexts 
where law-based intellectual property systems are not particularly effective in protecting 
knowledge. For instance, Fauchart and von Hippel (2008), examining the context of French 
cuisine, identify recipes as a form of innovation that is protected through norm-based 
intellectual property. It is seen as dishonorable for a French chef to copy another’s recipe or 
pass it around without permission. But one of the main limitations of norm-based intellectual 
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property systems is that they tend only to be effective among members of specific 
communities, and are not enforceable beyond their boundaries, which limits the possibility of 
exchanging inventions outside such well-defined communities. 
 
Contracts. Several studies rooted in the economic tradition focus on how contract 
design can be a way to avoid opportunism in technology transactions by aligning the 
incentives of the transacting parties. For instance, Arora (1995) models the case of a licensing 
transaction in which, along with the technology, a licensor had to transfer a piece of 
complementary know-how, which risked generating double-sided opportunism. The licensor 
has an incentive to skimp because providing such know-how is costly and the licensee will 
find it difficult to verify, objectively, the amount of effort exerted in transferring it. The 
licensee, meanwhile, has the incentive of claiming inadequate knowledge transfer of know-
how if payments are conditional on its provision. A possible contractual solution to this 
problem is that of staging payments to the licensor over time, which acts as a safeguard for 
the licensee, while the licensor can rely on intellectual property rights to protect its 
technology. The value to the buyer depends on the technology and know-how. Once 
transferred that know-how cannot be withdrawn, but by withdrawing the licensees’ rights to 
use the technology, the licensor gains a ‘hostage’, as the know-how is less valuable without 
such a license. A similar outcome can be produced by bundling the technology with 
complementary inputs, such as specialized machinery (e.g., Arora, 1996).  
The structure of payments can also play an important role in reducing opportunistic 
behaviors. In general, royalty schedules address the problem of moral hazard by aligning the 
incentives of the licensor and licensee (Arora, 1995, 1996; Contractor, 1981). Nevertheless, 
different types of firms might have different preferences about payment structures: for 
instance, startup licensors might prefer fixed fee contracts as a form of financing. So there is 
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a trade-off between satisfying the cash needs of a financially constrained licensor, which will 
probably involve upfront payment (Kulatilaka & Lin, 2006), and minimizing the moral 
hazard problem, which instead requires payments based on royalties.  
Other contractual clauses can also help reduce opportunistic behavior. In a cross-
country survey of both licensors and licensees, Caves et al. (1983) found several licensing 
agreements that included clauses specifically aimed at protecting one party from the other’s 
opportunistic behavior. For example, exclusivity clauses are especially common when 
licensees must make technology-specific investments to commercialize the invention they 
have licensed in. Similarly, when the technology being licensed is at an early stage, the help 
of the licensor may be more critical for the licensee, so exclusivity can act as a ‘hostage’ held 
by the licensee (Somaya, Kim & Vonortas, 2011),  restricting the licensor’s possibility to 
license the invention to other parties. Exclusivity restrictions imply some risks for the 
licensor though, such as the risk that the licensee fails to devote enough resources to ensure 
its successful commercialization or expropriates the knowledge and develops substitutes.  
Licensors can restrict the scope of the exclusivity they offer – to specific products or 
geographies (Somaya et al., 2011) – to mitigate such risks. 
Economic research on markets for technology and ideas relies on the assumption that 
contracts are the dominant mechanism firms use to regulate the dynamics of value creation 
and appropriation. But contract design might be particularly challenging in highly uncertainty 
contexts, due to the difficulty in foreseeing all possible future contingencies (Williamson, 
1989). And the effectiveness of contracts is at stake in situations where a third party 
(typically the state judicial system) cannot enforce them successfully. 
 
Relational governance. Organizational and managerial research emphasizes the 
existence of alternative mechanisms that firms can use to support contractual ones. This 
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literature builds on the idea that firms can substitute or complement contract design 
mechanisms with relational ones in order to avoid market failures due to opportunism. Such 
relational mechanisms allow the creation of self-enforcing agreements, which, in contrast to 
legal contracts, do not require a third party to enforce them (Dyer & Singh, 1998). These 
types of agreements are based on informal governance safeguards, such as trust or reputation. 
For example, the frequency and intensity of prior relationships build trust between partners 
and can exert a positive effect on the likelihood that they will engage in further transactions 
(Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009). In this vein, Gans et al. (2008) show that, where technology 
producers frequently interact, such as in Silicon Valley, knowledge transactions occur even 
before patents are granted. Furthermore, retaining previous partners helps firms reduce search 
costs (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009). 
Reputation and prestige can also substitute for more formal safeguards. Firm reputation 
is based on the quality of past performance (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009), whereas prestige is 
perceived quality, which may depend on factors such as the firm’s size, age, network 
position, and status (Podolny, 1993). Good reputation and prestige increase the probability of 
selling a technology, because potential buyers have positive expectations about the quality of 
the firm’s technology when it is placed on the market. They know that firms with high 
reputations and prestige have incentives not to behave opportunistically, in order to preserve 
those assets, which also reduce information asymmetry. In addition, more prestigious sellers 
are more visible, which reduces buyers’ search costs (Sine, Shane & Di Gregorio, 2003). 
 
Discussion. The analysis of previous literature suggests that research on the 
institutional determinants of markets for inventions has focused on the market imperfections 
associated with the characteristics of the object (the invention) being exchanged. Within this 
area, different groups of studies have investigated many types of formal and informal 
 18 
institutions that can alleviate this problem. Both formal intellectual property rights and social 
norms address opportunistic behavior at a contextual (e.g. industry or community) level by 
establishing forms of punishment for knowledge expropriation, reducing its attractiveness as 
an option and thus the incentives to choose it. Contracts and relational governance, instead, 
constitute solutions at the individual transaction level. Research on contracts builds on the 
assumption that market imperfections can be reduced if a third party enforces the contract, 
whereas research on relational governance emphasizes instead that agreements do not have to 
be formally written and can be self-enforceable, given the operation of some informal 
mechanisms, such as trust or reputation. 
Research rooted in the economic tradition has focused on studying the effectiveness of 
formal intellectual property rights in facilitating knowledge transactions (e.g. Gans et al., 
2008). This research stream has also identified some of the limitations of this protection 
mechanism. For instance, intellectual property rights mechanisms do not have the same level 
of effectiveness in all technological domains, and, because of the costs they can involve, are 
often unavailable to the smallest firms (e.g. Arora et al., 2001). Research in this area has also 
suggested how contracts should be designed in order to overcome market imperfections (e.g. 
Arora, 1995, 1996). Nevertheless, this stream of literature has not addressed the question of 
whether markets for inventions can exist and operate efficiently in contexts which are not 
strongly regulated by intellectual property rights or by contractual agreements.  
This research gap has been partly filled by studies more closely rooted in the 
managerial tradition, which have explored issues of heterogeneity among the transacting 
parties more closely at the individual, dyadic and community levels, and its role in explaining 
their differing abilities to engage successfully in transactions (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; von 
Hippel, 2010). These contributions are important for advancing our knowledge of markets for 
inventions because they emphasize how such markets might still function even where 
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intellectual property rights are weak. Although these studies have begun to identify 
alternative “softer” mechanisms for knowledge protection (e.g. Fauchart & von Hippel, 
2008), research in this area to date has only explored a limited number of contexts or well-
defined conditions in which these mechanisms can be effective. More studies in this area 
would be very useful.  
In order to get a more complete picture of how markets for inventions might exist and 
operate successfully, we need to be able to show how different mechanisms interact, and 
whether they reinforce or weaken each other’s effectiveness. For instance, an interesting 
debate concerns the extent to which informal institutions can be considered substitutes or 
complements to formal ones. Empirical findings here are mixed, with some studies 
suggesting that the presence of trust can obviate the need to have formal governance in place 
(e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland 2008) and others 
showing trust as a valuable factor in reinforcing formal contracts (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 
2002). However, research on markets for inventions has generally overlooked how law-based 
and norm-based intellectual property systems interact, and with what effects on technology 
transactions.  
 
Firm Characteristics 
Some firm level factors may influence a firm’s willingness or ability to buy or sell inventions. 
In this respect, the economics literature has mainly considered the role of the incentives 
which might encourage companies (or even individuals within companies) to engage in 
knowledge transactions. Such incentives, in turn, can depend on such firm characteristics as 
size (as in Fosfuri, 2006) or degree of R&D decentralization (as in Arora et al. 2013). In 
contrast, the literature rooted in management and organization theory has stressed the role of 
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firms’ capabilities, suggesting that some are more able than others to search for and to absorb 
external technologies (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
 
Firm size and organizational structure. The literature on markets for technologies 
suggests two main arguments to show that large firms may be less likely to trade their 
technologies. First, the incentives to license out naturally decrease with the potential 
licensor’s share in the product market (Fosfuri, 2006), as each firm which buys a firm’s 
technology becomes a potential new competitor. So the decision to sell a technology depends 
on the extent to which revenues generated from selling are higher than the potential rents 
dissipated as a result of greater rivalry. Other things being equal, firms with a small market 
shares are therefore more likely to license out their technologies than are larger firms, 
because they should suffer a smaller loss in profits from increased competition.  
Second, small firms may gain advantages from specializing in technology development 
when trading their technologies, by getting access to the more effective downstream assets 
and capabilities of larger firms (Arora et al., 2001). Although markets for inventions only 
allow inventors to appropriate a share of the ‘profit pie’ generated on the product market, 
small technology suppliers still may be able to gain from such trades as the pie becomes 
larger. Empirical evidence corroborates this argument, showing that a firm’s size has a 
negative relation with the likelihood of it licensing out its technology (Gambardella, Giuri & 
Luzzi 2007). This negative correlation holds even though large firms with multiple 
businesses are more likely to have non-core technologies that one might expect they could 
license out to increase their profits (Rivette & Kline, 2000).  
A related issue concerns the organizational structure of a firm’s R&D activities. In 
pioneering this important new research direction, Arora et al. (2013) argue that, when 
licensing decisions are decentralized to business units (rather than retained at headquarters), 
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firms are less likely to license, because top managers reward divisions less for their licensing 
profits than for their (more easily observed) production profits. Thus business unit managers’ 
incentives to scout for new technologies also diminish. Since larger firms are more likely to 
have decentralized R&D structures, this implies that they will be less likely than smaller 
firms to engage in technology transactions. Managerial evidence suggests that some 
companies (such as GE and IBM) have tried to reduce this problem by sharing the revenues 
from licensing a technology with the business unit that developed the technology 
(Chesbrough, 2006).  
Other organizational characteristics may also influence a firm’s incentives to use 
markets for invention. The characteristics of the firm’s incentive system may affect how 
many of its inventions it is willing to sell on the market rather than developing internally 
(Chesbrough, 2006). For instance, incentivizing R&D units on the basis of patents generated 
is likely to result in a surplus of inventions, some of which will probably be sold on the 
market. Firm’s R&D budget allocations may also lead to similar results. For instance, 
allocating research funds to broad areas rather than to very specific projects might result in 
inventions that are less likely to be used within the company and are therefore potential 
candidates for licensing out. Conversely, the likelihood that a firm’s inventions are used 
internally as opposed to being sold off and developed externally may depend on the existence 
of organizational mechanisms that enable business units to compete with external competitors 
to use internally-generated technologies (Chesbrough, 2006). Thus, some might decide that 
internally generated inventions can only be used by one of its business unit up to a defined 
time limit, after which they are made available to others. On the other hand, setting such 
limits might create a sense of urgency in assessing the potential usefulness of a technology to 
the firm itself, perhaps reducing the chances of it being sold on the market.  
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Firm capabilities. Apart from a few studies, most research on markets for technologies 
emphasizes the importance of incentives in motivating firms’ decisions to trade their 
technologies. Although incentives are certainly relevant, another important determinant is 
those firm capabilities that can facilitate technology transactions. On the demand side, 
absorptive capacity might be crucial (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989): in particular, a licensee’s 
stock of knowledge and the degree to which it has searched broadly in the past is likely 
influence its ability to exploit externally-acquired knowledge (Laursen, Leone & Torrisi, 
2010). Such external search processes will also be enhanced by firm’s possession of relevant 
information technologies capabilities that can facilitate data mining, analysis and 
management (Dodgson, Gann & Salter, 2006; Sakkab, 2002).  
However, we note an important distinction between the ‘ability to evaluate’ and ‘ability 
to utilize’ technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 1994b). The former refers to the firm’s ability 
to predict the value of the technology, and relates more closely to its scientific capability; the 
latter denotes its capacity to extract value from that technology, which requires technical 
competence as well as downstream assets such as manufacturing and marketing capabilities. 
These two distinct dimensions of absorptive capacity have different implications for a firm’s 
demand for external technology. In particular, firms with a greater ability to utilize them may 
be keener to acquire more external technologies (and thus more likely to license in new 
technologies), whereas firms with greater ability to evaluate them may acquire fewer external 
technologies, being better able to judge exactly which have the most promise.  
The overall intuition from this research is that, for any specific external technology they 
may be considering, firms receive signals about its likely future value to them, based on 
which they decide whether or not to acquire it. So firms establish a threshold against which to 
assess the signals that they receive and only buy those technologies that exceed that 
threshold. Firms which are better able to utilize new technologies tend to set lower 
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thresholds, and so buy more, because they can extract higher value from any they acquire. In 
contrast, firms better able to judge the value of such technologies are more selective (i.e., set 
higher signal thresholds) and will buy fewer. These firms recognize that a low signal is likely 
to equate to a low final outcome – but firms with less ability to judge may not be as sure 
about this relationship (Arora & Gambardella, 1994b). 
Absorptive capacity can also be partner-specific. Over time firms may develop the 
ability to recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge from a particular alliance partner 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). Partner-specific absorptive capacity can depend on the extent to which 
they have exchanged knowledge in the past, and so have developed overlapping knowledge 
bases and effective interaction routines (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Technological exchanges can 
also be facilitated by an effective transformative capacity, that is, the firm’s ability to 
constantly adapt and restructure its knowledge base (Garud & Nayyar, 1994). In a sense, this 
resembles absorptive capacity, in that it refers to the ability to assess technologies before 
choosing and using them. But here the focus includes the maintenance, reactivation and 
synthesis of those technologies: buyer firms need these capacities because time lags in the 
development of technologies and markets may mean firms cannot immediately utilize all the 
technologies they acquire. 
Finally, from the supply side, firms’ knowledge transfer capabilities are particularly 
valuable in stimulating technological transactions, especially where potential buyers have 
weak absorptive capacities (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013). Such capabilities help inventors 
communicate the knowledge underlying the technology effectively and explain how it can 
add value to buyers’ products or markets.  
 
Discussion. Research on the organizational determinants of markets for technology is 
still limited. In particular, it has largely overlooked the complexity of decision-making 
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dynamics at the individual and group levels within firms, seeing them just as monolithic 
decision makers. Arora et al.’s (2013) study goes in this direction, but much remains to be 
done.  
In fact, firms’ decisions emerge as the results of social and political interactions among 
individuals, within and beyond the organization. Because these different actors will have 
different utility functions (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Stern, 2004), react to different 
institutional logics (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011), and use 
different frames to “make sense of ambiguous information from their environments” (Kaplan, 
2008, p. 729), they are likely to develop different preferences about which technologies 
should be bought and which should be discontinued, and perhaps sold on the inventions 
market. Employees operating in stable groups often develop a ‘not-invented-here’ bias, which 
encourages them to believe that their internally-developed knowledge is superior to that 
originating outside the group (Katz & Allen, 1982). Nevertheless, in highly competitive 
organizations, internal knowledge may be ignored to avoid building the reputation of a 
colleague responsible for its development (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). To influence firms’ 
decisions to align with their own preferences, employees may engage in political behaviors 
(Kaplan, 2008), using different forms of power (Daft, 1978; Ibarra, 1993; Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008). Managers and shareholders can exercise more formal sources of power, based on their 
hierarchical authority; scientists will rely on more structural and informal sources of power 
that originate from their expertise in core technical activities (e.g., Krackhardt, 1990). We 
suggest the range of political dynamics within companies, and how they affect individuals’ 
decisions to buy or sell inventions, constitute promising paths for future research. 
 
Industry Structure  
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Existing research on markets for inventions has suggested that structural characteristics at the 
industry level may play an important role in affecting firms’ choices to trade in these markets. 
In particular, two broad dimensions have been considered by previous research: competition 
and market structures.  
 
Competition. The nature and extent of competition are likely to play an important role 
in determining the rate of exchanges in the invention market. As discussed earlier, Fosfuri 
(2006) and Arora and Fosfuri (2003) study the effect of competition in licensing agreements, 
and argue that firm decisions to out-license a technology depend on the comparison between 
the ‘rent effect’ and the ‘dissipation effect’, that is (respectively) the revenues they stand to 
gain from licensing (i.e., a share of the licensee’s profits) and the rents the technology would 
have earned in the product market (which equates to the difference in profits pre and post out-
licensing).  
The dissipation effect overcomes the rent effect both when there are few competitors 
and when there are many competitors. On the one hand, when there are few incumbents in the 
market, the rent dissipation due to an increase in competition is huge. On the other hand, 
when there are many competitors the rent effect is small. Hence, as Fosfuri (2006) argues and 
tests empirically, firms are less likely to license when there are few or very many competitors 
in a product market: too few mean the rents dissipated by licensing are too high, and too 
many will mean licensing revenues are too low. Thus, firms are more likely to license when 
they face moderate numbers of competitors. 
The impact of competition on the invention exchange also depends on the degree of 
product differentiation in the industry. In more differentiated product markets, each firm 
enjoys more profits because it is more sheltered from competition (Fosfuri, 2006). In such a 
situation, a firm which licenses its technology to a competitor in the same product niche will 
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see more of its profits destroyed than if both are operating in a more homogenous market. So 
the incentives to out-license are lower in a market where products are more differentiated. As 
we shall also see below, a crucial assumption in this logic is that the licensed technology is 
dedicated to the product market in which the licensor operates, and can only be used in a 
‘head-to-head’ product rivalry with the licensor. If the technology is also applicable to distant 
product markets, a more differentiated product market might, in fact, produce more licensing, 
as the licensor would have the opportunity to strategically select licensees from beyond its 
own market niche.  
Competition among potential buyers can also be leveraged to mitigate market 
imperfections. In this respect, Anton and Yao (1994) consider a model in which intellectual 
property rights cannot be enforced, there is more than one buyer (and thus demand side 
competition), and the only way an inventor can profit from an idea is by selling it to a 
downstream producer. Buyers are uncertain about whether the idea is valuable or not, and so 
want it disclosed so they can evaluate it. But, of course, once they see it, they may 
opportunistically steal the idea (which lacks patent protection). Anton and Yao (1994) argue 
that in this case the optimal solution for the seller is to disclose the idea to one potential buyer 
and threaten to disclose it to another firm if the first behaves opportunistically. This threat is 
likely to induce the first firm to not behave opportunistically, because, if it does not pay for 
the idea, but goes ahead and opportunistically exploits it anyway, the inventor can disclose it 
to the second buyer, thereby both making a sale and destroying some of the rents of the first 
(non)buyer.  
 
Market structure. Along with competition and product market differentiation, market 
structure can also influence technology exchanges because it affects the extent to which firms 
develop more general or more dedicated technologies. In this vein, Bresnahan and 
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Gambardella (1998) focus on market size, arguing that it has two components: ‘breadth’ (the 
number of diverse segments it includes) and ‘depth’ (the average size of each segment). As 
breadth increases, technology specialist firms will tend to try to produce general purpose 
technologies – those that can be fruitfully commercialized across several market segments – 
and aim to license these technologies out to downstream producers operating in different 
market segments. When a market gains greater depth, downstream firms are more likely to 
integrate backward themselves to produce dedicated technologies specific to their business 
needs.  
The rationale behind their model is that in broader markets specialized technology 
suppliers can gain economies of scale at the industry level by producing a general purpose 
technologies and selling them to different downstream segments of the final market. By 
contrast, when markets are deeper, the final segment of a specific application is large enough 
to justify a fixed cost investment in a dedicated technology. For instance, the Japanese 
machine tool sector developed and licensed-out compact general-purpose machines for the 
differentiated needs of small final producers in many manufacturing industries, while US 
machine tools largely involved technologies dedicated to the need of the large automobile 
industry. 
Gambardella and Giarratana (2013) develop this argument further. Drawing on 
Fosfuri’s (2006) framework, they consider the possibility of licensing a general purpose 
technology to product markets that are distant from that in which the licensor operates (in 
contrast to Fosfuri’s (2006) concentration on a dedicated technology that can only be used in 
the licensor’s product market or market segment). The implication is that, when product 
markets are differentiated, licensees destroy incumbents’ profits even more, so licensing is 
less likely, but where the technology is general-purpose, a fragmented market may induce the 
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licensor to supply the technology, provided the licensee operates in a different market 
segment.  
 
Discussion. Existing research on the impact of competition on trading in inventions 
emphasizes how trading or licensing a technology generally increases the level of 
competition within an industry by creating a new competitor. However, the relationship 
between competition and markets for inventions is far more complicated (and recognizing 
this issue opens avenues for future research). On the one hand, markets for inventions 
indirectly stimulate competition in the downstream market, by increasing the chances of entry 
of technologically weak firms that would probably not enter or prosper if they had to develop 
inventions internally. For example, Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2000) show that the 
supply of technologies from chemical processing industry specialists has favored downstream 
domestic chemical producers in developing countries who lacked the capacity to produce 
them internally. But the supply of technologies by technology specialists has not affected 
multinational firms, which have the capabilities to develop such technology in-house. This 
illustrates the point that markets for inventions benefit technologically less-advanced firms in 
particular, and can thereby enhance the degree of competition in an industry. Greater 
competition among downstream producers, in turn, typically results in greater horizontal 
differentiation in the downstream market, because companies try to ‘escape’ from the greater 
competition by developing heterogeneous products (Arora et al. 2001).  
However, the very existence of a market for inventions might also weaken competition. 
For instance, licensing might be used to deter entry: that is, an incumbent can use licensing 
strategically to reduce potential entrants’ incentives to develop their own technology (which 
could be superior, and thus make the incumbent’s product obsolete (Gallini, 1984; Hill, 
1992)). An innovative leader might also use licensing to control competition, such as when a 
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‘patent monopolist’ chooses, after its patent expires, to license its technology to weak 
competitors to crowd the market and deter entry by stronger ones (Rockett, 1990).  
Markets for inventions also reduce the costs of rivalry by allowing cross-licensing 
between companies. In certain fields, such as electronics and semiconductors, the set of 
technological skills a firm needs to master to go into production is quite broad, so that it is 
virtually impossible for a single firm to develop all the required technologies internally 
(Arora et al., 2001). In addition, when knowledge is cumulative, new inventions tend to build 
on previous ones (Grindley & Teece, 1997; Scotchmer, 1991), which can often produce 
overlaps between different firms’ innovations. To avoid the risk of infringing each others’ 
patents and the costs of patent enforcement, firms might enter cross-licensing agreements, 
where two or more firms grant each other licenses to use broad portfolios of patents within 
defined technological areas.  
 
Implications of Markets for Inventions  
Two main groups of studies have analyzed the implications of markets for inventions for firm 
behavior and performance. A first group – mainly including economic contributions from the 
literatures on markets for technology and markets for ideas – has analyzed how markets for 
inventions lead firms to specialize in those activities were they possess comparative 
advantages: invention for small firms and large scale development, manufacturing or 
commercialization for large firms (e.g., Arora et al., 2001; Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2002). A 
second group of studies – which includes both economic and management contributions – has 
focused instead on the consequences of knowledge transaction for firm innovative 
performance (e.g., Gans & Stern, 2000; Chesbrough, 2003). Table 3 provides a summary of 
selected papers which explore the implications of markets for inventions.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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---------------------------------------------- 
Specialization and Trade 
From a firm perspective, economic research has found that firms can capture the benefits of 
markets for inventions by specializing in the activity in which they enjoy comparative 
advantages, and then trade the outputs of those activities. Hence, young, small firms should 
specialize in upstream innovation development processes where they have comparative 
advantage. Arrow (1983) notes that the low organizational distance between corporate 
researchers and managers in such firms reduces asymmetric information between the 
inventors and the managers making decisions about the internal allocation of resources, 
which makes them more likely than large firms to pursue novel and riskier innovation 
projects.  
By contrast, large, established firms have comparative advantages in performing large-
scale development, production and marketing, as they are usually endowed with the assets 
required to commercialize their technologies effectively (Teece, 1986). Along a similar line, 
Holmstrom (1989) argues that diverse organizational structures have different advantages in 
performing innovative activities vis-à-vis the more routine activities involved in development 
and commercialization. The high level of bureaucratization typical of large firms is efficient 
for coordinating many repetitive tasks, but is detrimental to inventions. These different 
comparative advantages mean that markets for inventions are characterized by a division of 
innovative labor, because firms exhibit relatively superior performance when they specialize 
in the activities in which they possess more appropriate capabilities, and thus enjoy 
comparative advantages (Arora et al. 2001).  
Recent work by Serrano (2012) has confirmed empirically that gains from 
specialization and trade do exist, and can be large. He develops a model that uses information 
about patent renewals as a measure of the value of patent rights. He identifies the gains from 
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trade as the difference between the value if the patent is traded and if it is not (and uses an 
appropriate approach to identify counterfactual evidence), and shows that patents which are 
traded are three times more valuable than those which are not. Finally, he shows that the 
gains from trade are skewed: 70% of the total gains from trading in inventions accrue to the 
top 10% of patents, and 25% to the top 1%.  
In general, specialization and trade tend to benefit both technology suppliers and 
downstream producers. However, when downstream assets, rather than technologies, become 
the scarce resource, technology specialists can experience a significant loss in their 
bargaining power. This situation can occur when too many technology specialists vie to sell 
technologies (through licenses or alliances) to too few downstream producers – in such case 
the latter may be able to reap virtually all the suppliers’ rents. Overall, empirical evidence 
suggests that markets for inventions are more beneficial for firms owning downstream assets 
than they are for technology specialists. For instance, Arora and Nandkumar (2012), 
examining the software security industry, find that markets for inventions raise the value of 
marketing capabilities in ensuring firm survival, but decrease the value of technological 
capabilities. In the same vein, McGahan and Silverman (2006) use data on publicly traded 
U.S. firms to show that when ‘outsider’ firms produce inventions which could be fruitfully 
commercialized in a focal industry, the market value of companies in this industry generally 
increases. The reason is that outsiders generally lack control of downstream assets, so the 
only way they can profit from their inventions is to sell them to incumbent firms in the sector 
who can market them.  
One way in which technology specialists may escape this loss of bargaining power is 
by developing more general technologies. Discussing this issue, Gambardella and McGahan 
(2010) explain that the share of returns captured by technology suppliers will depend on their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the downstream producers. If the technology suppliers are much 
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smaller than the manufacturers, or if they are relatively many compared to the number of 
potential buyers, the suppliers’ bargaining power will probably be low. However, they also 
note that, by developing more general technologies, suppliers can move away from 
depending just on their bargaining power to secure their returns towards something over 
which they have more control, and is therefore worth investing in. More general technologies 
can be sold to more different buyers, so the overall returns their technologies can generate in 
the product market can be raised by increasing the number of applications they can target. As 
a matter of fact, the development of narrow technologies for well-defined applications 
constituted a major limitation for biotech specialists in the 1980s, because they could only 
license their technologies to limited numbers of buyers (Arora et al., 2001; Gambardella & 
McGahan, 2010). So, in the 1990s, many technology-based firms pursued strategies to invest 
in technologies with more general applicability that they could then sell to multiple buyers. 
Finally, as noted, the market for technology literature sees intellectual property rights 
as defining the value of inventions, and so encourages suppliers to trade their technologies 
without fear of their value being expropriated. But recent work by Galasso, Schankerman and 
Serrano (2011) has identified a new source of profitable specialization along the vertical 
chain from invention to commercialization. They argue that markets for inventions may 
produce both private and social welfare gains if firms trade on the basis of their comparative 
advantage in patent enforcement. This gain stems from the fact that companies which are 
better at enforcing patent rights tend to resolve disputes without resorting to courts, and thus 
save on litigation costs (which can be substantial). Empirically, they find that traded patents 
are less likely to be litigated, which implies that markets for inventions induce firms to trade 
according to their comparative levels of comparative enforcement advantage.  
 
Innovation 
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An important stream of literature has emphasized how markets for inventions influence 
innovation performance by impacting both firms’ incentives and capabilities to innovate. 
First, markets for inventions increase the incentives to innovate of firms which lack 
downstream capabilities. If there were no such markets, firms that produce inventions could 
only profit from them by selling products that embody their technologies, or by developing 
processes that employ them. Thus, companies which did not possess the downstream assets to 
perform these operations would have little incentive to generate inventions in the first place. 
So markets for inventions should increase overall innovation rates in the economy.  
Second, markets for inventions may also increase firms’ incentives to innovate because 
their R&D capabilities can become a bargaining tool in negotiations. This suggests that, as 
well as raising technology suppliers’ incentives to innovate, markets for inventions also raise 
the buyers’ incentives to invest in R&D capabilities. An incumbent which develops (or 
retains) some capability to develop a technology internally will have a stronger bargaining 
position vis-à-vis a start-up technology inventor (Gans & Stern, 2000). So incumbents have 
an incentive to remain active in R&D to support the outside option of inventing (or part-
developing) technologies themselves. The resultant increase in the R&D capacity of the 
sector should, again, raise overall innovation rates in the whole industry and the economy at 
large  
In addition, markets for inventions may increase the incentives to innovate in sequential 
innovation contexts, as they encourage (collusive) agreements between initial and subsequent 
innovators, and thus decrease competition between them (Green & Scotchmer, 1995). 
However, from the licensee perspective, incentives to invest in R&D might also be reduced 
by specific contract arrangements such as grant-back clauses, which secure the licensor “the 
rights to all subsequent technology advances or improvements introduced by the licensee, 
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based on the licensed technology” (Leone & Reichstein, 2012, p. 968), which obviously 
transfer the incentive to innovate from the licensee to the licensor.  
The existence of a technology market may also influence a firm’s ability to innovate. 
Innovation results from the combination of technological skills, so market availability and 
easier access to new knowledge should have positive effects on a firm’s innovative 
performance (Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 2010). In particular, licensing-in expands the 
firm’s exploration space (Laursen et al., 2010) and favors the quicker generation of new 
inventions by licensees (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). The innovative advantages of markets 
for inventions are particularly salient for firms that search more widely and more deeply 
(Laursen & Salter, 2006), but the positive impact of this type of search on performance is 
subject to decreasing returns, suggesting there is a point beyond which further search 
becomes unproductive.  
Further, Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell (2010) suggest that an open approach to 
innovation, which might include markets for inventions, can allow firms to discover new 
combinations of product features that would be less likely to emerge if R&D efforts were 
‘closed’. However, this beneficial effect comes with the drawback of reducing the possibility 
of firms controlling the trajectory of their innovation processes. An ‘open’ innovation 
approach also provides firms with the opportunity to allocate parts of their R&D processes to 
the entities better suited to perform them, whether internal or external to the organization. For 
instance, Thomke and von Hippel (2002) emphasize how certain product development stages 
can be performed more effectively and efficiently if they are outsourced to firms’ customers.  
Finally, several studies have focused on firm innovative performance and tried to assess 
whether internal R&D and external knowledge acquisitions are complements rather than 
substitutes, with most finding evidence of complementary relationships between internal and 
external R&D (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). However, the 
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evidence is mixed. For instance, Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2008) use data on nearly 
90,000 US establishments which have invested in Internet technologies to show that, in large 
cities where we expect to find a good supply of external technology services, firms substitute 
internal for external resources, whereas establishments in more rural areas make more 
significant internal investments instead. In sum, while companies may still want to keep some 
internal technological capabilities (to strengthen their bargaining positions as buyers in 
markets for inventions, or to exploit complementarities with external technologies) these 
markets also have the natural effect of substituting external suppliers’ R&D technological 
capabilities for internal capabilities.  
 
Discussion  
Overall, previous research into the implications of markets for inventions has highlighted the 
existence of two different routes through which these markets may increase firms’ economic 
performance. On the one hand, firms should specialize in the value chain activity where they 
have a comparative advantage (e.g., technology generation and selling or technology buying 
and commercialization), and then contract to gain access to other technologies or to 
downstream assets as needed. So specialization allows firms to generate higher overall value 
throughout the value chain, as the overall ‘pie’ firms produce jointly is larger than it would be 
if they all internalized both research and commercialization activities (Arora et al., 2001).  
On the other hand, to the extent that selling and buying technologies are complements, 
and internal R&D and external knowledge acquisitions reinforce each other (e.g., Arora & 
Gambardella, 1990; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006) , the optimal strategy would seem to be 
doing both – selling and buying – rather than specializing in just one activity. This is exactly 
the conclusion reached by studies of open innovation, defined as “the use of purposive 
inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and to expand the 
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markets for external use of innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough et al., 2006, p. 1). 
Research in this area emphasizes that profiting from markets for inventions involves 
simultaneous inbound and outbound innovation flows (Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006).  
Interestingly, this puts the two research streams at odds. The central tenet of the 
literatures on markets for ideas and markets for technology stresses the vertical specialization 
of upstream technology suppliers, which only produce and sell inventions, and downstream 
manufacturing firms, which only buy and market them. In contrast, the main argument of the 
open innovation literature is that firms should pursue simultaneous inbound and outbound 
innovation in an ‘open’ manner. That is, they should use external knowledge internally, on 
the one hand, but also exploit their internal knowledge by selling or sharing it, on the other 
(Chesbrough, 2003).  
The reason behind these different conclusions probably relates to the different 
conceptual focus from which these two research streams look at the phenomenon of markets 
for inventions. Research on markets for technology and markets for ideas, being more 
economics oriented, analyzes the issue from a more macro perspective. It builds on the 
central concept of comparative advantage, assuming that small and large firms are naturally 
endowed with different capabilities in inventing and commercializing and that both types will 
gain from specializing in the activity in which they are relatively more efficient, and therefore 
use market trading (e.g. Arora et al. 2001). However, this might only be optimal for small 
firms in the short term, while they are at their weakest and cannot modify their capabilities, 
and so the differences in relative advantages persist. If, instead, we take a long-term 
perspective, restricting their activities on the basis of their innate comparative advantages 
condemns small firms with low bargaining power to the fate of always only being able to 
appropriate the smallest slice of the overall pie created in any transaction. Hence, from a 
dynamic point of view, such small firms should probably try to ‘defy’ their comparative 
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advantage, and invest in the development or acquisition of downstream assets. This argument 
is somehow implicit in the open innovation literature, which, taking a firm-level perspective 
instead, suggests companies should put themselves in a position where they can be active as 
both technology buyers and sellers (e.g. Chesbrough, 2006).  
To make a comparison, the main idea of the research on markets for technology and 
markets for ideas is that firms should exploit their comparative advantage, while the main 
idea of the research on open innovation is that firms should make decisions on the basis of 
their competitive advantage. According to the open innovation literature, in order to be 
successful, knowledge-based companies should both buy and sell technologies. This stream 
therefore proposes that companies should invest in developing their R&D capabilities, in 
order to be able to assess the value of external technologies and understand which internally-
developed technologies should be sold (e.g. Chesbrough, 2006). At the same time, to the 
extent that most profits accrue to firms operating in the downstream markets, all firms should 
acquire the marketing capabilities to commercialize inventions. Overall, given the opposite 
conclusions reached by these literatures, a key research question concerns the extent to 
which, and the contingencies under which, specialization is more or less beneficial than an 
‘ambidextrous’ open-innovation approach.  
 
Expanding Research on Markets for Inventions:  
Market for Inventions and R&D Allocation Strategies among Technologies 
A natural consequence of markets for inventions is that they provide firms with more 
technologies from which to choose, as the scale of a market is inevitably larger than that of a 
single firm. In turn, this makes the decision of which technological paths to select and 
develop for firms’ competitive advantage particularly salient. However, previous research on 
markets for inventions has generally overlooked this topic. Certainly, some relevant prior 
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contributions have investigated how firms’ R&D choices are endogenous to the existence of 
markets for inventions, which might actually influence both the direction and intensity of 
firms’ R&D activities (e.g., Gambardella & McGahan, 2010; Gans & Stern, 2003). But we 
still lack a fuller understanding of how these markets affect firms’ decisions about how best 
to allocate R&D resources between distinct technologies to maximize their overall returns on 
their R&D investment.  
When confronted with the problem of allocating resources among different 
technologies, firms can adopt an extensive strategy, and invest resources in a wide variety of 
technologies, or an intensive strategy and commit to just one or a few (or even no one). Given 
the scarcity of firm resources, the decision between these strategies is crucial for knowledge 
intensive companies, regardless of the existence of markets for inventions, but it becomes 
more relevant when such markets are developed and well-functioning, and pose both 
opportunities and threats for companies. On the one hand, information asymmetry and 
potential opportunistic behavior of market counterparts (e.g., Arora et al. 2001; Arrow, 1962) 
means the likelihood of investing in poor inventions might increase when they are acquired 
externally. On the other hand, the division of innovative labor and the rise of a class of 
suppliers with superior technological capabilities (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a) mean the 
likelihood of picking extremely valuable inventions also increases.   
However, extant research on R&D allocation strategies generally builds on the 
assumption that the alternative technologies to be evaluated and developed are generated 
within firm boundaries, which is unrealistic in a world where, increasingly, inventions are 
traded or even freely shared. To understand the implications of relaxing this assumption, we 
begin by briefly categorizing and reviewing the main streams of existing research into R&D 
allocation strategies. We then explore how the existence of markets for inventions changes 
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the scenarios considered by these streams of research and, based on this, we identify and 
provide some preliminary answers to the emerging research questions.  
 
A categorization of R&D Allocation Strategies  
Different streams of research have investigated the R&D allocation problem from different 
conceptual angles and at different levels of granularity: the economics literature on R&D 
investments (e.g. Nelson, 1961), multimarket contacts (e.g., Bernheim & Whinston, 1990), 
and industry structure (Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998; Sutton, 1998); and the strategy 
literature on real options (e.g. McGrath, 1997), commitment (e.g. Caves, 1984; Ghemawat, 
1991), and incentives (Stern, 2004; Rotenberg & Saloner, 1994). These streams of research 
have developed separately, reflecting their focus on different theoretical assumptions. To be 
more precise, we identify two major groups of studies in extant research.  
A first group of studies has focused on understanding R&D allocation decisions in 
scenarios characterized by uncertainty about the value of different technologies. 
Contributions in this area recognize that a portion of a firm’s resources needs to be devoted to 
technology evaluation to guide its subsequent development investments. So research in this 
group has investigated the number of technologies that firms should experiment with in order 
to evaluate them and identify which are worth eventual development, and the literature’s 
overarching research question in this area is: How does uncertainty affect the optimal R&D 
allocation into technology evaluation?  
A second group of studies has focused instead on analyzing firms’ R&D allocation 
decision in scenarios without uncertainty, possibly because firms have already evaluated the 
available technologies. In such situations, firms (naturally) choose to develop those 
technologies which promise maximum profitability, so allocation choices are mainly affected 
by the structure of returns to development investments. This structure is characterized both by 
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the shape of potential returns to investment in any single technology (which can be linear, 
increasing or decreasing), and the extent of complementarities among multiple technologies. 
Thus this literature has focused on addressing the research question: How does the structure 
of investment returns affect the optimal R&D allocation aimed at technology development?  
Figure 2 provides a pictorial synthesis of the multiple research streams on R&D 
allocation strategies, and considers the simplest situation where a firm faces the choice of 
investing in either or both of two possible technologies, A and B.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
In a first scenario (investigated by research on technology evaluation, and shown in the 
upper part of the figure), firms are confronted with uncertainty about the value either 
technology could generate if developed. Investing in their development requires solving that 
uncertainty, but this may be particularly difficult: R&D investments inevitably deal with 
exploring the unknown (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1982, Rosenberg, 1996). Literature suggests 
the key contingency determining the choice between extensive and intensive evaluation 
strategies (i.e. evaluating many or few technologies) is the nature of the uncertainty involved, 
whether it is endogenous or exogenous (McGrath, 1997).  
Endogenous R&D uncertainty refers to uncertainty that can be reduced by firm actions, 
which tends to lead to pressure to invest immediately. Part of the economics literature on 
R&D investments focuses on situations characterized by this type of uncertainty and suggests 
that firms will adopt extensive strategies in such cases, making small scale investments in 
both technologies, aimed at discovering their underlying value (e.g. Loch, Terwiesch & 
Thomke, 2001; Nelson, 1961). Exogenous R&D uncertainty, in contrast, refers to uncertainty 
that cannot be reduced by firm action, regardless of the amount of resources invested. 
Research on real options focuses on this circumstance, suggesting that firms could choose not 
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to invest at all and waiting for the uncertainty to be resolved (e.g. McDonald & Siegel, 1986). 
As this strategy implies zero spreading of resource investment across multiple technologies, it 
could be thought of as an extreme example of the intensive strategy.  
In a second scenario (investigated by research on technology development, and shown 
in the lower part of the figure), firms know the value of each technology – their problem in 
this case concerns how many technologies to develop to maximize their overall returns. 
Under certain circumstances the solution is straightforward and, as such, has not been 
analyzed by extant literature (and, consequently, not considered in Figure 2). For instance, if 
only one technology (e.g., A) promises a positive return, a firm will invest all resources in 
that; or, if investments in technologies A and B seem to offer negative returns, it will choose 
not to invest at all. Extant research has focused instead on analyzing firms’ decisions in the 
presence of positive marginal returns of multiple technologies: here the optimal investment 
choice becomes more complex, and may involve investing in single or plural technologies 
according to the structure of expected returns.  
Specifically, firms are likely pursue an extensive R&D allocation strategy (i.e. invest in 
both technologies), in the presence of decreasing returns from investing in each or when they 
can identify potential complementarities between technologies. Decreasing returns imply 
that, after a certain level of investment in the most profitable technology, the marginal return 
will become inferior to that on the second most profitable one. Eventually, a firm will invest 
in both technologies. A similar outcome will be observed where the technologies are 
complementary, since developing both technologies simultaneously will be more profitable 
than developing them separately. But if returns to developing each technology are linear or 
increasing, or in the presence of diseconomies of scope, firms are likely to pursue an 
intensive allocation strategy, investing all their investment resources in the technology 
offering the highest marginal returns. The key contingencies determining the structure of 
 42 
returns as identified by prior research include the nature of incentives (e.g., Rotenberg & 
Saloner, 1994; Stern 2004), of competitive factors (e.g., Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; 
Ghemawat, 1991), or of the technology itself (e.g., Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998; 
Cockburn & Henderson, 1996) 
 
Technology Evaluation 
Extensive Strategies for Technology Evaluation 
In the face of endogenous uncertainty, firms will generally experiment with multiple 
technologies, aiming to discover their comparative values. Existing research suggest firms 
can use two main approaches for this purpose: parallel (e.g. Nelson, 1961) or sequential (e.g. 
Loch et al., 2001) strategies. 
 
Parallel strategy. A parallel investment strategy (Nelson, 1961) consists of investing a 
limited amount of resources across multiple technologies, so conducting parallel ‘trials’, in 
Nelson’s words. Nelson’s article focuses on the optimal number of technologies a firm can 
consider in parallel in order to identify the most valuable. In his model, firms face a choice 
between different technologies each associated to a different outcome. In the face of 
uncertainty, even if the overall distribution of different outcomes may be known (i.e., that 
only a certain percentage of new technologies will turn out to be valuable), they don’t know 
which ones will without conducting trials. In other words, the outcome associated with a 
certain technology can only be revealed after a certain amount of resources have been 
invested in testing it. Certainly, the more technologies are tested, the greater is the likelihood 
that at least one will exceed a critical value level – such as the level above which it is 
profitable to develop the technology and commercialize the associated innovation.  
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In the scenario Nelson (1961) describes, one obvious variable determining the optimal 
number of technologies is the cost of experimenting with each new technology: given the 
firm’s resource constraints, the lower the cost of any trial, the more than can afford to run. 
Nelson’s model also considers the role of statistical interdependency between technologies, 
that is, whether their outcomes are correlated. Correlation between technologies reduces the 
number of technologies that need to be tested. For instance, if a given technology is bad, it is 
more likely that a second similar and so positively correlated technology will also be bad. In 
contrast, if the technologies are different and so statistically independent, the outcome of the 
second technology cannot be so predicted.  
Several papers, especially over the last decade, have drawn on Nelson’s original 
contribution to develop different angles on the parallel research process. We consider a few. 
Dahan and Mendelson (2001) generalize Nelson’s intuition by studying the underlying 
properties of outcome distributions in greater detail. Specifically, they study how the optimal 
number of technologies (which they call “tests”) changes according to the distribution’s 
parameters. They find it increases with the variance in the technology value distribution and 
with the extent to which the distribution has fat tails or a higher upper bound, as they all 
imply a higher likelihood that any one technology will deliver an extremely high outcome. As 
the expected value of the best technology increases, the firm is more willing to invest 
resources in additional technology.  
Boudreau, Lacetera and Lakhani (2011) propose a test of the benefits a parallel 
approach can provide. Specifically, they apply Nelson’s (1961) argument in the empirical 
context of tournament-like contests, and consider the impact on innovation output when a 
new competitor enters and brings a new alternative technology to the competition. They 
argue that such an addition might increase the value of the best solution identified, even if the 
individual effort put in by each contestant decreases in line with the lower probability of 
 44 
being the winner. Interestingly, they also show that, when the competition occurs in an 
uncertain technological field (which means more variance in the technology value 
distribution), the increase in the value of the best solution due to the entry of a new 
competitor is even greater. As a result, they provide empirical evidence that the benefits to a 
firm of a parallel technology strategy substantially increase with the level of uncertainty. 
 
Sequential strategy. An alternative approach in the face of endogenous uncertainty is to 
invest in different technologies sequentially. This approach is based on the idea that testing 
alternative technologies over time, rather than in parallel, provides additional information that 
guides the direction of subsequent tests. Loch et al. (2001) compare the relative advantages of 
parallel and sequential testing of alternative technologies. The main benefit of parallel testing 
over sequential testing is that it reduces the time required to acquire information and thus for 
discovering the best technology. This aspect might be particularly important in the context of 
an R&D ‘race’, where firms aim to be the first to have the patent granted, as the first able to 
reach the market will capture the lion’s share of rents (e.g., Cockburn & Henderson, 1994). 
But in a parallel testing approach, firms cannot use learning from earlier tests in later ones, a 
benefit provided by sequential testing (see also Thomke & von Hippel, 2002), so parallel 
testing tends to involve more tests, and thus greater costs.  
Loch et al.’s (2001) model yields some important implications. First, when tests are 
more expensive, sequential testing is the favored response: but if the trials take time, or if the 
firm’s opportunity costs of time are high, they will prefer parallel testing. Second, trials may 
vary in their quality, in the sense that there may be a difference between the test outcome and 
the real value of the design or technology chosen, and firms may be aware of this. The more 
imperfect the trials are the lower is the appeal of the parallel testing process, because the 
‘noise’ of experimentation makes each test less informative. Third, modularity in the 
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underlying design or technology reduces testing costs, as it reduces the number of 
configurations that have to be tested. In all, Loch et al.’s (2001) model concludes that the 
optimal investment solution might involve a combination of parallel and sequential testing, in 
which batches of multiple designs or technologies are tested sequentially, starting with those 
with the highest ex-ante probability of success.  
 
Intensive Strategies for Technology Evaluation 
When uncertainty is exogenous, firms’ actions cannot reduce it. In this case, a dominant 
strategy is to wait for the resolution of uncertainty. This strategy has been suggested by real 
option theory, which originated in the context of financial options (Black & Scholes, 1973). 
 
Options to defer and to grow. An option gives its owner the right (but not the 
obligation) to purchase an underlying asset in the future – an option’s value increases with 
the uncertainty a firm faces, or, more precisely, with the volatility of the expected value of 
the underlying asset (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). The key mechanism is that the sunk cost of the 
option limits the potential losses of the investment, while the potential gains are unlimited, 
and will increase in line with the uncertainty of the investment returns. In the context of the 
choice between technologies, a strategy consisting of not investing in any technology can be 
seen as an “option to defer” investment (Huchzermeier & Loch, 2001; McDonald & Siegel, 
1986). The cost of the option is the foregone benefit that the firm would realize had it 
invested immediately. If this cost is too high, firms might consider the strategy of investing 
the lowest amount of resources in each technology required not to lose the opportunity to 
invest in the future: this would constitute a “growth option” (Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998).  
Whether firms facing exogenous uncertainty about the potential future value of a 
technology should simply defer investment or make very limited investments instead 
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depends, first, on the cumulativeness of R&D – that is, the extent to which future R&D 
opportunities are contingent on early R&D investments (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1997). Second, 
this choice may depend on the specific characteristics of the investing firm. A ‘ wait-and-see’ 
strategy may be more appropriate for fast followers or fast seconds (Markides & Geroski, 
2005) who have superior R&D capabilities and thus execute projects faster than competitors, 
and so can afford to wait longer for uncertainty to be resolved. Third, it might depend on the 
presence of preemption risks, due, for example, to network effects. When these effects are 
strong, the growth option value is likely to be greater that the deferral option value (Lin & 
Kulatilaka, 2007). The choice is also contingent on the level of uncertainty. In particular, 
Folta and O’Brien (2004) argue that, when uncertainty levels are very high, investing 
immediately is more valuable than waiting, since the maximum value of an option to defer is 
bounded, but the maximum value of a growth option is not.  
 
Future Research Directions: Markets for Inventions and R&D Allocation Strategies for 
Technology Evaluation 
The existence of markets for inventions calls for the conclusions reached so far by the 
literature on technology evaluation to be re-examined, and opens several research avenues. 
The key research question is how markets for inventions affect the choice between extensive 
and intensive strategies for technology evaluation in the face of endogenous or exogenous 
uncertainty. Overall, we suggest that the development of such markets might increase the 
benefits of waiting strategies for integrated downstream firms, because – even when 
uncertainty is endogenous - they can shift the burden of its resolution from buyers to 
technology suppliers. The investment of technology suppliers allows downstream firms in the 
Silicon Valley computer industry, for instance, to wait until uncertainty is resolved, and then 
buy the most suitable technology for their purposes (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  
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Future research should also attempt to corroborate empirically the suggested 
relationship, and to clarify the contingencies under which it is stronger or weaker. For 
instance, in the face of competition, investing earlier and pre-empting competitors may be 
crucial and the strategic choice of waiting might be less attractive in general. However, 
waiting might be relatively more attractive for firms who are more likely to secure a contract 
with suppliers providing the most valuable technologies, because they hold higher reputations 
or scarce and valuable downstream resources.  
Furthermore, firms have an incentive to wait only to the extent that markets for 
inventions are transparent about the characteristics and potential value of technologies for 
potential buyers, as is the case in the software industry, where the potential value of the 
technologies software start-ups produce can be demonstrated relatively simply through demos 
(Greenberg, 2013). But in other industries (e.g. nanotechnology), where technologies are 
more complex, companies may not be able to resolve uncertainty until they buy the 
technology and start experimenting with it. In these cases, they can only resolve uncertainty 
endogenously, using parallel or sequential approaches. In this regard, another possible 
research direction would be to explore how the existence of markets for inventions affects 
investing firms’ choices between parallel and sequential strategies. In principle, the 
development of a market for inventions reduces the cost of any deal, by increasing the supply 
of technologies, and so lowering the price of inventions, which favors a parallel strategy over 
a sequential one. And when suppliers in the market are more independent, a parallel approach 
would also be more effective. These factors suggest that, other things being equal, a parallel 
approach is more likely to emerge when technology suppliers do not share a common milieu, 
such as a similar geographic location.  
Finally, our reasoning so far builds on the assumption that, in the face of uncertainty, 
some firms will invest earlier than others and so become technology suppliers. But this raises 
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another question about which firms have the superior risk bearing ability that would allow 
them (in the face of uncertainty) to invest and generate technologies to sell on the market in 
the first place. For instance, those firms with a superior ability to evaluate uncertainty – or to 
influence its resolution – even when such uncertainty is exogenous for other firms in the 
industry might be more likely to develop and trade new technologies. Future research might 
usefully investigate the issues to find empirical support for them. 
 
Technology Development 
Extensive Strategies for Technology Development 
When there is no uncertainty about the value of different technologies, firms do not need to 
engage in their evaluation. The literature identifying R&D investment strategies in the 
absence of uncertainty again falls into two groups according to the choice between extensive 
and intensive investment strategies. The first group focuses on contingencies that make it 
convenient for firms to invest and develop multiple technologies simultaneously – that is, to 
choose more extensive forms of R&D allocation.  
 
R&D complementarities. A primary reason to invest in multiple technologies is the 
existence of R&D complementarities between those technologies, which often follows from 
the nature of the knowledge field(s) in which firms operate. For instance, Cockburn and 
Henderson (1996) show that, in the pharmaceutical sector, knowledge developed in a specific 
therapeutic area can be usefully applied in another area, because human body systems do not 
usually operate in isolation. Complementarities may also be firm-specific, and some 
organizations are better equipped with organizational practices and routines aimed at 
combining and redeploying knowledge (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).  
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Competitive considerations. From a competitive standpoint, the returns to pursuing 
multiple technologies targeted to different markets increase due to weaker competition: 
multimarket competition literature (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Porter, 1980; 1985) 
suggests that companies can benefit from competing with rivals across several markets 
because this reduces the intensity of rivalry, improving all firms’ profitability (for a review 
see Chen & Miller, 2012). The structure of competitive relationships may be stabilized by a 
“live-and-let-live” policy (Bernheim & Whinston 1990; Scherer, 1980), so that rivalry 
extending across multiple markets leads to mutual forbearance, and markets whose 
participants compete simultaneously in other markets can mutually agree to set higher prices 
and thus all achieve greater profitability (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; 1999). These findings 
confirm the idea that firms might find it valuable to enter several markets to gain 
interdependencies with their rivals. However, as a firm’s multimarket contacts grow, the 
losses that can be expected from the possible retaliation by a competitor who interprets the 
entry of a focal firm as an aggressive move will also increase (Baum & Korn, 1996). 
 
Incentives. The design of employees’ incentives may also lead firms to pursue 
multiple technologies. Scientists and researchers enjoy having autonomy to develop any 
technology they are interested in, and may even accept lower remuneration to retain that 
creative autonomy, increasing firm profitability (Stern, 2004). At the same time, firms where 
individual employees are given the latitude to develop new technologies are likely to purse 
more extensive R&D allocation strategies than firms where a single decision-maker picks 
which technologies are to be developed. As a result, individual scientists’ preference for 
autonomy may indirectly create economies of scope. By allowing employees to retain their 
autonomy, firms generate multiple diverse technologies and wage costs are reduced (Stern, 
2004).  
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Intensive Strategies for Technology Development 
A second group of studies focuses on those factors that make returns on investing in few 
technologies (or even one) more convenient, in other words, where firms adopt more 
intensive strategies. The most immediate reason concerns the existence of linear or increasing 
returns to investment in a single technology.  
 
Economies of scale at the R&D level. In the simplest case, such linear or increasing 
returns are due to the nature of the technology itself. For instance, cumulative investment in a 
specific technology may increase firm performance due to its specialized learning over time 
(Ghemawat, 1984; Spence, 1979). Especially when the technology is radically new, its 
development might require a great amount of managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997). Major 
investment in a unique technology can serve as a valuable mechanism for focusing 
managerial attention, which previous research has shown to be quite a valuable resource for 
the company (Eggers, 2012). On the other hand, as Sutton (1998) and Bresnahan and 
Gambardella (1998) point out, some technologies might produce multiple applications at a 
zero or low marginal cost, which creates incentives to concentrate resources on their 
development, and to reutilize them in multiple submarkets, rather than spreading resources 
across several technologies each dedicated to a specific submarket. 
 
 Competitive considerations. The dynamics of competition may also explain increasing 
returns from investing resources into a single technology. Literature on commitment has 
suggested that ‘locking-in’ a large amount of resources into the development of one, market-
specific, technology can reduce rivalry from competitors, mainly due to resource pre-emption 
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Shapiro, 1994). And certain technologies are characterized by network effects, such that 
individuals’ utility from using them increases with the numbers of other users. Thus, 
consumers prefer to adopt the technology they believe will be adopted by the majority of 
other consumers. In such cases, a major investment in a technology can be a signal of strong 
commitment and create favorable expectations about its future market size, staring a ‘virtuous 
circle’ of user growth.  
 
 Incentives. Commitment may also be important for providing firms’ scientists with 
the right incentives to increase their productivity. Rotenberg and Saloner (1994) argue that 
pursuing multiple technologies create diseconomies of scope in R&D by reducing 
employees’ motivation. The basic intuition is that returns generated by a firm’s R&D 
investment depend, among other factors, on the effort exerted by individuals within the 
organization, and the level of those efforts may depend on the expectations that they will be 
well rewarded. But this will only occur if those ideas are implemented, which is less likely 
where many technologies compete for a limited amount of firm resources. So, in order to 
convince employees to exert more effort and increase productivity, firms should only commit 
to investing in a limited number of technologies. 
 
Future Research Directions: Markets for Inventions and R&D Allocation Strategies for 
Technology Development 
As we have noted, once uncertainty is resolved, firms should choose an intensive or an 
extensive R&D allocation strategy for developing a technology according to various factors, 
including the existence of increasing returns to scale and complementarities among 
technologies, competitive considerations and optimal internal incentive design. Hence, the 
question is: How do markets for inventions affect this decision? 
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As far as R&D complementarities are concerned, markets for inventions allow firms to 
access a broader range of different ‘pieces’ of knowledge, which can be fruitfully recombined 
to increase innovative performance (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; 2006; Leiponen & Helfat, 2011). 
The opportunities for knowledge recombination and cross-fertilization that markets can 
produce are likely to be higher than when R&D is just conducted internally. Path dependency 
means that firms tend to continue to invest in the same or related technological trajectories 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Nelson & Winter, 1982), so solutions generated within a firm are 
likely resemble one another, and there is little room for recombination. In contrast, 
technologies pursued by distinct firms are likely to differ (Cohen & Malerba, 2001). 
However, an important question unaddressed by previous research concerns the extent to 
which firms may be able to recombine external as opposed to internal technologies, or to 
accurately assess the existence of synergies – or of diseconomies of scope – in managing 
multiple technologies in whose development that have not been closely involved. We suggest 
that, to evaluate the opportunities markets for inventions offer for technology development, 
future research should investigate more closely the extent to which the benefits from diversity 
exceed the costs.  
As for competitive considerations, we argue that markets for inventions can facilitate 
the acquisition of different technologies targeted at specific markets, or even of general 
technologies applicable to multiple markets, and thus provide firms with opportunities to 
manipulate the degree of their competitive interdependence with rivals more quickly, through 
a multi-market contact strategy (e.g., Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). This provides an 
interesting starting point, from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint, for future 
research. The existence of markets for inventions might also affect the design of firms’ R&D 
incentive structures. As mentioned above, Rotenberg and Saloner (1994) point out that 
committing to allocate resources to a limited number of technological areas improves R&D 
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employees’ incentives to invent, by increasing the likelihood that each employee’s ideas will 
be adopted, and the employee rewarded accordingly. But when internally generated ideas 
compete to be adopted with external ones, such an incentive strategy may not be credible 
enough to employees to be effective. Consequently, an interesting question for future 
research concerns how markets for inventions might affect the levels and types of incentives 
technology firms offer their scientists to innovate. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have provided a unifying framework for understanding the existence and 
growth of ‘markets for inventions’, where knowledge elements which are disembodied from 
individuals, organizations and products are traded. In order to do so, we have brought 
together various streams of literature, which, due to their different assumptions, have focused 
on different aspects of the phenomenon. Furthermore, we pointed out that extant literature in 
this area has generally neglected the implication of invention markets for firms’ decision 
about how to allocate resources among different technologies. Given the lack of research on 
the topic, we started to establish and explore the link between markets for inventions and 
firms’ R&D allocation strategies, and to identify a research agenda in this domain. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Selected Papers on the Definition of Markets for Inventions 
Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
Arora, Fosfuri & 
Gambardella, 2001 Invention price 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Knowledge-based companies increasingly use markets for technology, arms-length 
transactions that involve the exchange of technology in disembodied form for a price  
Chesbrough & 
Appleyard, 2007 Invention price Theoretical model 
Firms might adopt a partial free revealing approach, such that only one part of the invention 
is free but the other part needs to be bought 
Chesbrough, 2003; 
Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke &West, 
2006 
Invention price  
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Firms and industries experiment with novel business models based on open innovation, 
which include forms of knowledge sharing occurring both within and outside markets 
Gans & Stern, 2003 Invention price Theoretical model 
Start-ups innovator can compete indirectly in the product market by using a “cooperation” 
strategy, based on selling their inventions to other firms—usually incumbents—who operate 
as "conduits" for technology commercialization in the product market 
von Hippel, 2010 Invention price Theoretical model Individual users often freely reveal their knowledge because they want gain reputation 
among their peers or because they would like to see their ideas transformed into innovations 
Arora & Gambardella, 
1994a 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical model 
The production of general and abstract knowledge, due to advancements in theoretical 
understanding of problems, instrumentation, and computational capability, increases the 
possibility of division of innovative labor among firms 
Kogut & Zander,  
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical Model Tacit knowledge is shared and transferred more effectively within firms than across markets 
Nonaka, 1991 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical model 
Tacit knowledge can typically be transmitted through social interactions occurring within the 
boundaries of a given organization, where individuals can easily interact face-to-face, and 
share common “languages”  
Winter, 1987 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical Model Firms can choose strategically the extent of knowledge codification, based on the 
opportunities they have to collaborate with unaffiliated entities 
Baldwin & Clark, 2000 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical model Firms shifting toward a more modular system may take advantage of modular innovations produced by many independent suppliers 
Baldwin & von Hippel, Knowledge Codification Theoretical model Modular design architecture are an important element to facilitate collaboration. Modularity 
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Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
2011 & Division of Innovative 
Labor 
tends to affect design and coordination costs 
Brusoni & Prencipe, 
2001 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical model Firms are heterogeneous in their ability to explore and experiment alternative patterns of problem decomposition 
Langlois, 2002 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical model 
Modularity constitutes a way of managing complexity. Organizations reflect non-modular 
structures and decision rights, rights of alienation, and residual claims to income reside 
among different firms 
Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor  
Theoretical model 
Modular systems allow a form of coordination which is alternative to authority, i.e. 
embedded coordination. Embedded coordination is a form of system coordination based on 
standardized components and organizational interfaces, that creates information structures.  
Modularity requires codification of architectural knowledge about component interactions 
Schilling, 2000 
Knowledge Codification 
& Division of Innovative 
Labor 
Theoretical model 
Modularity is a continuum describing "the degree to which a system's component can be 
separated and recombined, and it refers both to the tightness of coupling between 
components and the degree to which the "rules" ol the system architecture enable (or 
prohibit) the mixing and matching of components" 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Selected Papers on the Determinants of Markets for Inventions 
Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009 Institutions Quantitative 
analysis 
The frequency and intensity of prior relationships contribute to build trust between partners 
and can exert a positive effect on the likelihood that they engage in further transactions 
Anand & Khanna, 2000 Institutions Quantitative 
analysis 
There exist robust cross-industry differences on several contractual features (exclusivity, 
cross-licensing, ex ante vs. ex post technology transfers, licensing to unrelated vs. related 
parties) 
Arora, 1995 Institutions 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
The provision of technical service (i.e., tacit knowledge) can increase the enforceability of 
technology licensing contracts 
Arora, 1996 Institutions 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Bundling complementary inputs with know-how in a technology package can overcome the 
problems in contracting for know-how 
Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006 Institutions 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Increases in the effectiveness of patent protection increase licensing propensity, but only 
when the firm lacks specialized complementary assets required to commercialize new 
technologies 
Arora, Fosfuri & 
Gambardella, 2001 Institutions 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Markets for technology are more likely to be observed in environments characterized by 
strong IPR regimes 
Arrow, 1962 Institutions Theoretical model Indivisibility, appropriability and uncertainty constitute sources of market for knowledge failures 
Berkovitz & Feldman, 
2008 Institutions 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Knowledge transfer decisions are affected by norms. Individuals tend to adhere to norms to 
which they have been exposed in the past, but are also influenced by the local work 
environment 
Caves, Crookel & 
Killing, 1983 Institutions 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Markets for intangible knowledge are subject to market failures deriving from: small-
numbers bargaining, appropriability problems, uncertainty, transaction costs, and impacted 
information coupled with opportunism 
Chesbrough, 2003; 
Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke &West, 
2006 
Institutions 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Open innovation occurs also in contexts beyond the ones in which formal intellectual 
property rights are relevant 
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Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
Dyer & Singh, 1998 Institutions Theoretical model 
Firms can substitute or complement contract design mechanisms with relational ones in 
order to avoid market failures due to opportunism. Such relational mechanisms are self-
enforcing agreements that do not require a third party to enforce them 
Fauchart & von Hippel, 
2008 Institutions 
Qualitative and 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
Norms-based intellectual property (IP) systems are a complement to or substitute for law-
based IP system 
Gans & Stern, 2003 Institutions Theoretical model Firms' choice of their technology commercialization strategy depends on the level of 
excludability of the environment 
Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2008 Institutions Quantitative 
analysis 
From the buyer's perspective, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of 
IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas 
Hall & Ziedonis, 2001 Institutions Quantitative 
analysis 
Strengthening of patent rights induces "patent portfolio races" among capital-intensive firms 
and facilitates entry by specialized design firms 
Kulatilaka & Lin, 2006 Institutions Theoretical model Due to cash-constraints issues, small firms might prefer to be paid with a fixed sum rather than with royalty rates 
Pisano, 1990 Institutions Quantitative 
analysis 
Small-number bargaining problem might lead firms to internalize R&D. Hence 
pharmaceutical companies are more likely to internalize R&D in those biotechnology 
product areas in which R&D capabilities are concentrated in fewer R&D supplier 
Shane, 2002 Institutions Quantitative 
analysis 
University inventions are more likely to be licensed when patents are effective. Patent 
effectiveness also increases the royalties earned for inventions licensed to non-inventors, as 
it reduces the risk of opportunistic behaviors 
Somaya, Kim & 
Vonortas, 2010 Institutions 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Exclusivity is used as a contractual hostage to safeguard licensees’ investments in 
complementary assets and to enable contracting over early stage technologies 
Teece, 1998 Institutions Theoretical model Profits from knowledge assets depend on interplay between the strength of the 
appropriability regime and firm dynamic capabilities 
Arora, Fosfuri & 
Gambardella, 2001 Firm Characteristics 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Markets for technology foster the division of innovative labor between small and large firms 
Arora & Gambardella, 
1994b Firm Characteristics 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Firms with a greater ability to utilize demand more external technologies (i.e., are more 
likely to license in new technologies). However, firms with a higher ability to evaluate may 
acquire fewer external technologies 
Arora, Fosfuri & 
Roende, 2013 Firm Characteristics Theoretical model 
When licensing decisions are decentralized to business units, rather than centralized at 
headquarters, firms are less likely to license, because top managers reward divisions less for 
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Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
their licensing profits than for their (more easily observed) production profits 
Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 
2013 Firm Characteristics 
Quantitative 
analysis 
The buyers’ cost of integrating a licensed technology is affected by suppliers’ knowledge 
transfer capabilities, buyers’ absorptive capacity, and the co-specialization between R&D 
and downstream activities in the buyers’ industries 
Chesbrough, 2003; 
Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke &West, 
2006 
Firm Characteristics 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Organizational practices may foster knowledge exchange 
Dodgson, Gann, Salter, 
2006 Firm Characteristics Case study analysis 
Firms’ external search processes are fostered by their possession of relevant information 
technologies capabilities 
Fosfuri, 2006 Firm characteristics Quantitative 
analysis 
The licensing-out of technology entails a trade-off: licensing payments net of transaction 
costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced 
market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. 
Firms with a small market share are more likely to license out than larger firms because they 
suffer a smaller loss in profits from the increase in rivalry 
Gambardella, Giuri & 
Luzzi, 2007 Firm Characteristics 
Quantitative 
analysis 
The most important determinant of patent licensing is firm size. Other factors (patent value, 
breadth, protection) have an impact, but not as important 
Henkel, 2006 Firm Characteristics Quantitative 
analysis 
Firms balance openness and protection of intellectual property by revealing knowledge 
selectively. Revealing policies are strongly heterogeneous across firms 
Laursen, Leone & 
Torrisi, 2010 Firm Characteristics 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Firm assimilation capacity and monitoring ability affects the decision to explore distant 
technologies through licensing-in 
Rivette & Kline, 2000 Firm Characteristics Theoretical model 
Companies increasingly use patents for making revenues (with licensing out) or blocking 
competitors. Large companies may use licensing for making profits out of relatively unused 
inventions 
Sakkab, 2002 Firm Characteristics Case study analysis Maintaining effective connections requires an information management strategy based on knowledge sharing reporting systems 
Sine, Shane & Di 
Gregorio, 2003 Firm Characteristics 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Institutional prestige and reputation increases the licensing rate of the university, as they tend 
to solve market imperfections 
Anton & Yao, 1994 Industry Structure Theoretical model 
In the absence of legal property right protection, an inventor with little wealth can expect to 
appropriate sizable share of the market value of the invention by fully disclosing information 
about the invention value 
Arora, Fosfuri & Industry Structure Theoretical model Development of specialized upstream technology suppliers in leading countries improves 
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Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
Gambardella, 2000 & Quantitative 
analysis 
technology access and lowers investment costs for downstream firms in follower countries 
Bresnahan & 
Gambardella, 1998 Industry Structure Theoretical Model 
As market breadth increases, technology specialists will produce general technologies 
supplied to the downstream producers that operate in different segments of the final market. 
By contrast, as depth increases, downstream firms are more likely to integrate backward and 
produce dedicated technologies for their business 
Fosfuri, 2006 Industry Structure Quantitative 
analysis 
The licensing-out of technology entails a trade-off: licensing payments net of transaction 
costs(revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced 
market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. 
In product markets with more incumbent competitors, both the rent dissipation from the 
creation of a new competitor, and the revenue from licensing decrease 
Gallini, 1984 Industry Structure Theoretical model An incumbent firm may license its own technology to reduce the incentive of a new entrant to produce its own, possibly better, technology 
Gambardella & 
Giarratana, 2013 Industry Structure 
Quantitative 
analysis 
When product markets are fragmented, innovators can identify potential licensees in market 
niches in which they do not compete directly. This possibility requires the licensor to 
develop general technologies that can support distant applications 
Gambardella & 
McGahan, 2010 Industry Structure Theoretical Model 
The development of general purpose technology to be licensed to downstream specialists is 
an increasingly adopted business model. By developing more general technologies the 
suppliers can move away their source of returns from bargaining power, to something that 
they can invest in and control 
Grindley & Teece, 1997 Industry Structure Theoretical model. Licensing and cross-licensing are increasingly adopted by companies in semiconductors and 
electronics, as a mean to prevent litigation and soften the cost of competition 
Rockett, 1990 Industry Structure Theoretical model For an incumbent, licensing agreements can be a mean for ‘choosing’ relatively weak 
competitors 
Scotchmer, 1991 Industry Structure Theoretical model 
In cases where early innovations constitute a foundation for later innovations, the first 
innovator should be given some claim on the profits of the later innovators, so that the first 
has enough incentive to invest.. This is possible through increasing patent breadth or 
allowing (collusive) licensing among patent holders 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of Selected Papers on the Implications of Markets for Inventions 
Author(s), publication 
year 
Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
Arora & Nandkumar, 
2012 Specialization and Trade 
Quantitative 
analysis 
A greater supply of technology diminishes the importance of technical ability as a source of 
competitive advantage, but enhances the impact of marketing capability on performance  
Arora, Fosfuri & 
Gambardella, 2001 Specialization and Trade 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
At the firm level, markets for technology increase the strategy space; at the industry level, 
they lower barriers to entry and increase competition 
Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom 2002 Specialization and Trade Theoretical model  Capturing value from early stage technology requires appropriate business models  
Galasso, 2011 Specialization and Trade 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Markets for inventions may induce firms’ specialization according to their comparative 
advantage in enforcing intellectual property 
Gans & Stern, 2003 Specialization and Trade Theoretical model Under certain conditions, markets for ideas allow small firms to avoid knowledge 
expropriation and appropriate the economics returns from innovation 
Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2002 Specialization and Trade Quantitative 
analysis 
Returns to specialization and cooperation vis a vis competition in the downstream market are 
increasing in control over IPRs, low transaction costs, sunk cost for market entry 
Holmstrom, 1989 Specialization and Trade Theoretical model  
Different organizational structures have diverse advantages in performing innovative 
activities vis-à-vis more routine activities, like, for example, development and 
commercialization 
Serrano, 2011; Serrano 
2010 Specialization and Trade 
Quantitative 
analysis Gains from specialization and trade exist 
Teece, 1986 Specialization and Trade Theoretical model 
When imitation is easy, the profits from innovation may accrue to the owners of 
complementary assets, rather than to the developers of the intellectual property. Innovators 
may access these assets through licensing agreements 
Almirall & Casadesus- 
Masanell, 2010 Innovation Theoretical model 
Open approaches to innovation allow firms to discover combinations of product features that 
would hardly emerge under integration. However this beneficial effect comes with the 
drawback of reducing firms’ possibility of individual firms to take control over the 
innovation process and in particular over the trajectory taken by such process 
Arora, Fosfuri & 
Gambardella, 2001 Innovation 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
By fostering the division of inventive labor, markets for technology increase innovation 
performance 
Chesbrough, 2003; 
Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke &West, 
Innovation 
Theoretical model 
& Quantitative 
analysis 
Access to internal and external knowledge and simultaneous inbound and outbound of 
knowledge increase firms’ innovative performance 
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Author(s), publication 
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Key dimensions 
considered in connection 
with markets for 
inventions 
Method Key findings 
2006 
Chesbrough & Crowther, 
2006 Innovation Theoretical model 
Open innovation does not occur only in high-tech industries but also in more established and 
mature ones. It involves simultaneous inbound and outbound of knowledge 
Forman, Goldfarb & 
Greenstein, 2008  Innovation 
Quantitative 
analysis 
In large cities, where we expect to observe a good supply of external technology services, 
firms substitute internal for external resources. By contrast, establishments make more 
significant internal investments in professional internet services in more rural areas 
Gans & Stern, 2000 Innovation Theoretical model When the expected licensing fee is high, incumbents have an incentive to remain active in R&D to feed the outside option of making the technology themselves 
Green & Scotchmer, 
1995 Innovation Theoretical model 
Markets for inventions may increase the incentive to innovate in sequential innovation 
contexts, as they encourage cooperative agreements between initial and subsequent 
innovators decreasing the level of competition among them 
Leone & Reichstein, 
2012 Innovation 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Licensees are faster to invent than non-licensees, but this effect disappears if the licensing 
contract includes a grant-back clause 
Thomke & von Hippel, 
2002 Innovation Theoretical model 
Certain stages of product development can be performed more effectively and efficiently if 
they are outsourced to a firm’s customers 
West, 2003 Innovation Theoretical model  There exist a trade-off between strategies maximizing innovation and those maximizing 
appropriability 
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FIGURE 1  
Structure of the Existing Literature on Markets for Inventions 
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FIGURE 2 
Structure of the Existing Literature on R&D Allocation Strategies 
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